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Abstract. This paper investigates if the existence of complex structures plays an im-
portant role in corporate governance. It uses GMM estimation on a panel of Western 
European firms. We find that the presence of a second and third large shareholder has 
a significant positive effect on firm value. This study underlines the importance of the 
number of blockholders as a determinant of firm value, when taken as a moderator of the 
contestability effect. It shows that the legal context and company-specific characteristics 
play a crucial moderating role for contestability. In contrast to previous research, we 
find that contestability plays a less relevant role in family firms. We also find that this 
last result does not vary significantly with the identity of the remaining elements of the 
coalition. Also, our study suggests that contestability is less important in companies led 
by majority shareholders. 
Keywords: blockholders, contestability, firm value, family firms, investor protection, dy-
namic panel GMM.
JEL Classification: G3, G32. 
Introduction
Why the sharing of company control is preferable to absolute control is still a key issue 
in corporate governance for firms with dominant shareholders. In fact, large companies 
have multiple small blockholders (Jara-Bertin et al. 2008; Laeven, Levine 2008; Attig 
et al. 2009; Konijn et al. 2011).
Four aspects drive this study. First, as there is no consensus on the virtues of block-
holder dispersion, we aim to contribute to the debate on the existence of an optimal 
dispersion of ownership.
Second, we aim to test if the legal context moderates the contestability effect as 
suggested by Konijn et al. (2011). Third, conflicting results (Maury, Pajuste 2005; 
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Jara-Bertin et al. 2008) when exploring non-family firms is an additional motivation 
of this paper. Finally, we aim to investigate if the identity of the second blockholder 
moderates the contestability effect.
We confirm that the existence of a second largest shareholder limits opportunistic be-
havior of the main blockholder. Moreover, for a given level of contestability, the effect 
on firms’ value is dampened in coalitions of three blockholders vis-à-vis coalitions with 
only two members. Altogether, the results suggest a complementarity between exit and 
voice governance mechanisms with the existence of an optimal number of blockholders.
This paper evidences the moderating role of ownership concentration contrasting with 
the results of Jara-Bertin et al. (2008) renewing the need for further research in this 
area. Moreover, the results suggest that excessive contestability reduces the effect on 
the value of firms. Also, our study suggests that contestability is significantly lower 
in family firms. Moreover, our result does not support Maury and Pajuste’s (2005) or 
Jara-Bertin et al.’s (2008) work for family firms allowing only to conclude that the 
contestability effect when the two principal blockholder belong to the same groups of 
investors is small when compared with the contestability effect exerted by a blockholder 
that does not belong to the same group of investors as the main blockholder.
We confirm Bloch and Hege’s thesis (2001) on the moderating role of the legal context.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 describes the theoretical framework. We 
describe in Section 2 the sample selection and the research methodology. Section 3 pre-
sents the empirical results. Finally, we present the results and discuss our main findings.
1. Theoretical background and hypothesis
1.1. Contestability and value
In theory, there are two views regarding the role of the second largest owners. Winton 
(1993) argues that non-controlling shareholders with significant stakes have incentives 
to monitor controlling shareholders to avoid profit diversion. Also, decisions which may 
disadvantage small shareholders are prevented by bargaining problems among multiple 
controlling shareholders (Gomes, Novaes 2006). Also there is the possibility of collu-
sion between the second and the largest shareholder to share private benefits. Whether 
the second controlling owner will monitor or collude with the first owner depends on 
the relative benefits of monitoring, which is proportional to the relative size of the 
ownership stake (Zweibel 1995).
Dhillon and Rossetto (2009) emphasize that the existence of many blockholders helps 
shift the voting outcome more towards the interests of minority shareholders. Edmans 
and Manso (2011) argue that the existence of a multiplicity of blockholders can form a 
forceful monitoring mechanism in disciplining the behavior of managers by aggressive 
trading of information.
Lehman and Weigand (2000) found evidence that the company’s profitability increases 
with a second large shareholder. Volpin (2002) claimed that in Italy company market 
value is higher with blockholder syndicates than with a single blockholder.
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Maury and Pajuste (2005) studied the effect of multiple large shareholders on company 
valuation for a sample of Finnish listed companies. Their main result is that company 
value increases with control contestability.
Laeven and Levine (2008) find that higher valuations correlate with the voting rights 
of the second owner, confirming the research of Volpin (2002). Thus, we propose our 
first hypothesis:
H1: The value of companies increases as contestability of the main blockholder increases.
1.2. The identity of the two largest shareholders and the effect of contestability 
on the value of companies
The family firm has the advantage of joining control and management decisions, lead-
ing to reduced agency costs (Jensen 1986). Additionally, as families do care about 
their companies (they constitute most of their wealth, identity and patrimony), it is the 
family interest to avoid acting opportunistically with regard to the earnings obtained 
(Anderson, Reeb 2003) and to invest maximizing the value of the firm, thus benefiting 
the minority shareholders. As family control leads to higher firm valuation (Anderson 
et al. 2003; Barontini, Caprio 2006; Villalonga, Amit 2006), it would be expected that 
the contestability effect of the main blockholders would be lower in family firms.
On the other hand, the lack of alignment between family interests and those of other 
shareholders, involving management and control, may lead to investment decisions that 
do not necessarily maximize value and the interests of other shareholders (Fama, Jensen 
1983; Barontini, Caprio 2006).
Consistent with the greater potential for expropriation in family-controlled firms, there is a 
broad consensus that contestability is more relevant in family companies (Maury, Pajuste 
2005; Jara-Bertin et al. 2008; Attig et al. 2011). We thus formulate the following hypothesis:
H2:  When the dominant blockholder is a family, the level of control rights in the hands 
of the second and third most significant shareholders will be more relevant for firm 
value than in non-family firms.
Now we examine whether the identity of the second owner vis-à-vis the identity of the 
largest owner matters for corporate valuation.
Maury and Pajuste (2005) suggest that two families can make profit diversion easier 
due to increased cohesion and cooperation in the controlling group when compared to 
a coalition formed by family and non-family shareholders. Jara-Bertin et al. (2008) 
confirm that family firms with a second largest reference shareholder have a negative 
effect on the value of firms. Hence, we formulate the following hypothesis:
H3:  The contestability of the principal blockholder in family firms is less relevant when 
the two main shareholders belong to the same family.
1.3. Legal system
We aim to test Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) thesis who posit that monitoring by large 
minority shareholders is effective only in countries with good investor protection. When 
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legal investor protection is high, collusion is more difficult between the investor and 
potential monitoring shareholders (Pagano, Roell 1998).
Diferently, Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) maintain that in environments with poor 
shareholder protection, the most efficient ownership structure emerges in a control 
structure with multiple shareholders. Moreover, Bloch and Hege (2001) claim that 
when legal protection for minorities is weak, multiple blockholders provide some 
compensation.
We expect to confirm that the existence of complex structures plays an economically 
more relevant role, specifically in contexts where only voting rights provide a real 
chance to condition the behavior of the main shareholder, which is an empirical question 
not yet explored in Western Europe.
H4:  The contestability of the principal blockholder is more relevant when the protec-
tion of shareholder rights is more fragile, according to a substitution effect between 
internal and external governance mechanisms.
2. Data, variables and methodology
2.1. Data
We use data on 938 non-financial listed firms across Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and the UK, from the AMADEUS database. We exclude financial firms and utilities. 
For each country we prepared a panel of non-financial companies with financial and 
ownership information available between 2002 and 2006.
We use total shareholding (percentage of total voting rights held by the shareholder 
where the path through which ownership is held may be direct or indirect) and excluded 
firms that have missing data for all control variables used. Since the focus is on the role 
of contestability, we also exclude firm-years that do not have any blockholder with at 
least 10% of the votes.
2.2. Methodology 
In order to test the relationship between the contestability of the first largest blockholder 
by the second and the third largest blockholders and the market value of the firms, we 
consider the following model:
Tobin’s Qit = α0 + β1Tobin’s Qi,t-1 + β2BLOCK1it + β3COALITIONit + β4DEBTit + 
β5ROAit + β6SIZEit + β7INTANGit + β8GROWTHit + β9AGEit + ζt + λi + δs + θp + εit.
The dependent variable reflects the current value of expected future performance. The 
natural log transformation was performed in order to reduce problems of heteroscedas-
ticity. To reduce the impact of extreme values, we impose a cut-off at the 5th and 95th 
percentiles (Barontini, Caprio 2006).
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For robustness purposes, we include additional control variables (Table 1) as adopted 
on previously (Aggarwal et al. 2011; Laeven, Levine 2008; Jara-Bertin et al. 2008; 
Maury, Pajuste 2005).
Table 1. Detailed definitions of the variables
Variable Description
Dependent variable 
Tobin’s Q (TA–BVE+MVE)/TA, where TA is Total Assets; BVE is the book value of equity and MVE is the market value of equity
Independent and dummy variables
COALITION
(BLOCK2+BLOCK3)/(BLOCK1+BLOCK2+BLOCK3), where BLOCK1, 
BLOCK2 and BLOCK3 are the control rights shares held respectively  
by the largest, second largest and third largest shareholders of the  
company
BLOCK123 The percentage of control rights held jointly by the three major shareholders of the company
DTWO Dummy that equals one when the coalition includes only two shareholders
DTHREE Dummy that equals one when the coalition includes three shareholders
MJ Dummy that equals one if the largest shareholder has at least 50 % of the control rights. NMJ is a complementary dummy
DMORE Dummy that equals one if the two largest shareholders have at least 50 % of control rights; DLESS is a complementary dummy
DHIGH
Dummy that equals one if the second and the third large shareholders 
have joint control rights above those of the main blockholder; DLOW is a 
complementary dummy
FD Dummy that equals one if the largest shareholder is an individual or a family with at least 10 % of the control rights; NFD is a complementary dummy 
FFD Dummy that equals one if the two main blockholders belong to the same family
FNFD Dummy that equals one if in family firms the second blockholder does not belong to the family
SGD Dummy that equals one if the two main shareholders are the same group of investors; NSGD is a complementary dummy 
ANGLO Dummy where a value of 1 is assigned for companies from the UK (Common Law countries); NANGLO is a complementary dummy 
ASD1
Dummy where a value of 1 is assigned for companies from the countries with 
an Anti-self-dealing index > 0.38 (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Portugal, 
and the UK); ASD2 is a complementary dummy 
Control variables
DEBT NCL/(NCL+MVE) where NCL is the book value of the long term debt and MVE is the market value of equity
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When we explore the impact of the identity of the two largest owners, we categorize 
them into several investor groups: (i) family, when the principal blockholder is either 
a family or an individual; (ii) institutional investors, when the principal blockholder is 
either a financial company, an insurance company, a mutual pension fund/trust, a private 
equity company or a bank; (iii) corporate investors, when the principal blockholder is 
a non-financial company and (iv) other.
We included the following dummies: industry (δs); time effects, (ζt); a control for unob-
served time-constant individual heterogeneity of firms (λi); country (θp). εit is a white-
noise error.
Table 1 provides information and definitions of all variables used.
To control dynamic endogeneity, unobservable heterogeneity, and simultaneity, and fol-
lowing Wintoki et al. (2012), we use the dynamic panel GMM estimator as proposed 
by Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998). However, as it has its limita-
tions, we present two-step estimates, which in theory provide robust results.
As small panel samples may produce downward bias in estimated asymptotic standard 
errors in the two-step procedure we implemented the Windmeijer (2005) correction.
An optimal choice of instruments is a clear influence on the consistency of estimates. 
Therefore, we report a test for the second-order serial correlation, m2 statistic (Arellano, 
Bond 1991). We use the Hansen J-statistic of over-identifying restrictions to test for 
the absence of correlation between the instruments and the error term. We also report a 
difference-in-Hansen test (Roodman 2009) that evaluates if supplementary instruments 
required for systems estimation and used in the levels equation are valid.
3. Results
3.1. Descriptive results
Consistent with prior studies, Table 2 shows that the principal owner holds, on average, 
38.90% of voting rights, suggesting that the main agency problem in these firms stems 
from conflicts of interest between controlling and minority shareholders. Table 2 shows 
the relevance of focusing on the three main shareholders; on average they account for 
63.90% of voting rights.
SIZE Ln (Fixed Assets)
INTANG INTANG=IFA/TA where IFA is the book value of the intangible fixed assets and TA is total assets
ROA EBITDA/TA where EBITDA denotes earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization and TA is the book value of total assets
GROWTH (REVt–REVt-1)/REVt-1 where REV is the revenue
LNAGE Ln (YEARS) where YEARS is the number of years since the firm began its activity
(End of Table 1)
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Table 3 provides insights into the distribution of shares among large shareholders. Con-
sistent with previous studies (Jara-Bertin et al. 2008; Laeven, Levine 2008), we notice 
a complex ownership structure (with at least two large blockholders) in 71.43% of the 
sample.
3.2. Regression results
3.2.1. Contestability and company value
The results in Table 4 for COALITION, confirm the positive effect of contestability 
of the first shareholder on the value of firms. The coefficient estimate in column 1 of 
Table 4 is positive (0.222), which supports H1 and is consistent with Bloch and Hege’s 
(2001) model.
Furthermore, control variables included in the analysis strongly influence the regres-
sion results and have the expected coefficients according to previous research (Maury, 
Pajuste 2005; Laeven, Levine 2008; Aggarwal et al. 2011).
 Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the main variables
Variable Obs. Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max.
TOBIN’s Q 4,690 100.0 1.369 1.203 0.617 0.203 5.917
BLOCK1 4,690 100.0 38.9 36.1 20.1 10.0 95.0
BLOCK123 4,690 100.0 63.9 61.3 26.7 10.0 99.3
FAMILY Nº 
SHAREHOLDERS 1,165 24.8 2.190 2 0.766 1 3
NON-FAMILY Nº 
SHAREHOLDERS 3,525 75.2 1.985 2 0.776 1 3
COALITION 3,350 71.4 0.428 0.358 0.226 0.101 0.667
FAMILY – COALITION 913 27.3 0.445 0.464 0.134 0.111 0.667
NON-FAMILY – 
COALITION 2,437 72.7 0.421 0.437 0.139 0.101 0.667
COALITION20 1,576 33.6 0.426 0.443 0.210 0.250 0.667
FD 1,165 24.8 0.248 0.000 0.432 0.000 1.000
DEBT 4,690 100.0 0.275 0.241 0.207 0.000 0.989
SIZE 4,690 100.0 12.253 11.745 2.825 5.858 20.433
INTANG 4,690 100.0 0.204 0.153 0.181 0.000 0.969
ROA 4,690 100.0 0.106 0.104 0.088 –0.403 0.643
GROWTH 4,690 100.0 0.069 0.027 0.480 –0.979 16.717
AGE 4,690 100.0 44.91 30.00 44.28 1 628
Note: This table reports summary statistics for a sample of 938 firms (4,690 observations) between 
2002 and 2006.
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number % BLOCK1 BLOCK2 BLOCK3
ONE CONTROLLING 
SHAREHOLDER 1,340 28.57 36.26% – –
MULTIPLE LARGE 
SHAREHOLDERS 3,350 71.43 – – –
 of which 2 large 1,842 54.99 43.80% 20.93%
 of which 3 large 1,508 45.01 35.31% 20.83% 14.89%
TOTAL 4,690 100.00 38.83% 20.88% 14.89%
Notes: This table reports the total number and the percentage of firms in the sample 
with (i) one controlling owner, and (ii) multiple large shareholders.
Table 4. Relation between firm value and the contestability effect. Moderating role of 
ownership concentration and the number of blockholders
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Number of instruments 54 61 58 55 63
Wald (H0 – test of 
equality of interaction 
variables)
– 0.006 0.003 0.048 0.005
m2 (p-value) 0.674 0.388 0.997 0.772 0.763
Hansen J-statistics 
(p-value) 0.506 0.602 0.697 0.554 0.767
Diff-in-Hansen test 
(p-value) 0.567 0.645 0.356 0.927 0.969
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics (t-statistics are based on robust, firm-clustered 
standard errors) while p-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 
10, 5, and 1% levels.
We decided to test if the contestability effect is moderated by the concentration of own-
ership. First, we test a restriction on the first largest shareholder having control rights 
above or below 50%, the majority control threshold. We find that the COALITION 
coefficient (Table 4 column 2) for firms with no majority blockholders (0.383) is larger 
than the coefficient for other firms (0.216). The results suggest, unlike those evinced by 
Jara-Bertin et al. (2008), that the effect of contestability is higher among firms that do 
not have a majority shareholder. In our view, our results are more in line with basic eco-
nomic rationale that supports that the majority shareholders would be more independent 
in their decisions and thus the contestability effect would be expected to be less intense.
The interaction of contestability and ownership concentration in the hands of the two 
largest shareholders is tested in the model presented in column 3 of Table 4. The results 
show that this relationship is stronger when the two largest shareholders together have 
voting rights below 50% (0.403) than in other cases (0.143). The hypothesis that both co-
efficients are statistically equal is rejected by the Wald test at 1% level. We conclude that 
when the coalition has majority stakes the likelihood of collusion behaviors increases and 
the contestability effect decreases. In any case, the contestability effect remains positive.
(End of Table 4)
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In model 4 of Table 4 we test another cut-off point that seems particularly relevant, de-
termined by the sum of voting rights of the second and third shareholder being greater 
than the voting rights of the main blockholder, which happens in our sample in 21.51% 
of the observations. Our results suggests that minority shareholders anticipate one of 
two possible negative outcomes: (i) excessive conflict among the three major share-
holders that may impede the implementation of interesting projects for the company 
as a result of different sensitivities to risk, and difficulties in agreeing on how best to 
finance these investments; (ii) largely equal control rights between the three principal 
shareholders may, on the contrary, determine a shared set of objectives between these 
behaviors and result in collusion to the detriment of other shareholders.
As a complement, we explore if the existence of complex structures with three block-
holders is more interesting than with only two. Column 5 of Table 4 shows the coef-
ficients of two interaction variables that for the same level of contestability, where the 
effect on the value of companies is seen to be substantially higher if performed by a 
single contestant (0.328) than by structures with three blockholders (0.191). The hypoth-
esis that both coefficients are statistically equal is rejected at 1% level.
These results suggest that: (i) the circumstances of a coalition including three sharehold-
ers make the negotiation process particularly difficult when compared to a situation of 
having only to reconcile the interests of the two major shareholders; (ii) an alternative 
explanation can also found in the circumstance that the interests of the second and third 
are not necessarily aligned and therefore did not have a monolithic behavior with the 
principal shareholder; (iii) a third and final possibility is that the second or third block-
holder is aligned with the interests of the main shareholder, which results in a dramatic 
reduction in contestability.
3.2.2. Is the effect of contestability on the company value moderated  
by the identity of the two largest shareholders?
We explored the interaction between the variable COALITION and the identity of the 
first large shareholder by estimating the models presented in column 1 of Table 5. We 
found that the COALITION coefficient for family firms (0.161) is smaller than the 
coefficient for non-family firms (0.341). Equality of the coefficients is rejected at the 
5% level. This is an unexpected result, which does not support H2, and contradicts 
previous empirical evidence as reported by Maury and Pajuste (2005) and Jara-Bertin 
et al. (2008).
Our evidence means that the minority shareholders in family firms anticipate that the 
remaining blockholders have a lower propensity to challenge the main blockholder 
than in other companies. The following factors help in the explanation of our results: 
(i) research is almost unanimous regarding the positive effect family firm leadership 
has on firm value (Anderson et al. 2003; Villalonga, Amit 2006). This may mean a 
greater coincidence of interests between major family blockholders and other minority 
shareholders. Moreover, family firm shareholders concentrate much of their wealth and 
have on average higher equity capital than other groups of shareholders. These two 
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Table 5. Relation between firm value and the contestability effect. The moderating role  
of identity and the institutional context
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Number of instruments 63 77 60 74 75
Wald (H0 – test of 
equality of interaction 
variables)
0.011 0.035 0.0020 0.0485 0.0443
m2 (p-value) 0.333 0.554 0.312 0.850 0.848
Hansen J-statistics 
(p-value) 0.421 0.407 0.514 0.412 0.574
Diff-in-Hansen test 
(p-value) 0.634 0.690 0.540 0.921 0.801
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics (t-statistics are based on robust, firm-clustered 
standard errors) while p-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 
10, 5, and 1% levels.
circumstances determine the internalization of the consequences of their behaviors and 
therefore a greater alignment with the interests of other shareholders and by this means a 
reduction in the importance of contestability as a mechanism for corporate governance; 
(ii) the fact that the age of family businesses is, on average, lower than that of the other 
companies (Table 2) may help to explain this result as the contestability effect is lower 
among younger firms; (iii) the fact that family firms coalitions on average possess more 
shareholders (Table 2) and, as we demonstrated, for the same level of contestability, the 
effect on firm value is an inverse function of the number of elements of the coalition.
In model 2 of Table 5 we test if the identity of the second blockholder moderates the 
contestability effect in family firms. The equality of all coefficients is rejected (5% 
level) by Wald test. Additionally, we could not reject the null hypothesis of the equal-
ity of the interaction coefficients pertaining to family firms (COALITION*FFD and 
COALITION*FNFD) and consequently we reject H3. When we tested the equality 
of any of these two interaction variables with the interaction variable concerning non-
family firms we rejected these hypotheses at the 5% level.
Subsequently, we created a dummy variable equal to 1 if the two blockholders have the same 
identity, and 0 otherwise. As can be seen in Table 5 column 3, the coefficient in the case 
where the two main shareholders belong to the same group is 0.154, and 0.309 otherwise. 
Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level and their equality is rejected at 
the 1% level. Thus, our empirical evidence does not support one of the main conclusions 
for family companies provided by Maury and Pajuste (2005) or Jara-Bertin et al. (2008).
3.2.3. Legal system
We explore the interaction of the variable COALITION and the Anglo variable. As 
shown in the column 4 of Table 5, the coefficient of the variable COALITION is smaller 
(End of Table 5)
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for companies from the UK (0.145) than for the other countries in our sample (0.485). 
The relationship between the contestability of the first largest shareholder and the com-
pany value in continental Europe is positive and more influential than for the UK, con-
tradicting what has been suggested by Pagano and Roell (1998). On the contrary, our 
results validate H4 and the thesis defended by Bloch and Hege (2001).
This result is consistent with the thesis that company-level governance mechanisms 
might be substitutes for weak country-level governance (La Porta et al. 2002). The 
results suggest that under a weak legal system, minority shareholders know that only 
a more balanced distribution of voting rights between the three principal shareholders 
allows them to anticipate a real ability of the second and third shareholders to contest 
the decisions of the largest shareholder, which deviates from the purpose of maximizing 
the wealth of minority shareholders (Bennedsen, Wolfenzon 2000).
Another competing explanation for the contestability effect being greater in continental 
Europe is that the more concern the major shareholder has regarding the interests of other 
blockholders, the more democratic decisions will be made, while this concern will be rein-
forced where other blockholders are aligned in their interests with the minority shareholders.
To test the consistency of this result we split the sample using an anti-self-dealing 
index (ASD) (Djankov et al. 2008). When we divided the sample with the variable 
Anglo it could always be said that the difference could result from other factors, such 
as concentration of ownership in the hands of the main blockholder (20.37% in the UK, 
43.38% in the other countries). In the division now proposed this difference is small 
(for countries with ASD > 0.381) as concentration of voting rights in the hands of the 
main shareholder is 27.24%. This regression (model 5 of Table 5) confirms the results 
as the impact of the contestability effect on firms’ value varies according to different 
legal framework and institutional environment.
3.3. Robustness tests
First, we test the contestability effect in line with Konijn et al. (2011) using the 
GINI variable and Dispersion ratio and Cash-flow ratio (Laeven, Levine 2008) and 
Contest (Jara-Bertin et al. 2008). The coefficients are in line with those obtained for 
the variable COALITION. Thus, the contestability effect is robust regardless of the 
proxy used.
Second, despite using a cut-off point of 10% of voting rights for identifying a block-
holder we decided to test, in line with Laeven and Levine (2008), whether the adoption 
of a 20% cut-off level would be relevant (COALITION20 was constructed algebraically 
with the same formula of COALITION). The results suggest that the choice between 
10% and 20% did not seem to be relevant.
1This cutoff, compared to specific values of the sample, allows a closer approximation to our objec-
tive, which was to divide the sample into two groups with the same dimension. It has no other 
significance.
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Third, we decided to test the model 3 of Table 4 for the same cut-off but change to 
considering the sum of voting rights of the three main shareholders. The results are very 
much in line with that obtained before. 
Finally, we decided to test our main results employing a sample that excludes the UK 
(756 firms and 3035 observations). All results are consistent with the empirical evidence 
obtained for the full sample (938 firms). As expected, all values of the variable COA-
LITION are greater than those obtained in the full sample. This result is in line with 
Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000), Bloch and Hege (2001).
Conclusions
First, we document an inverse relationship between the voting rights of the second and 
third most significant shareholders and agency costs, providing support for the view that 
minority expropriation will be lower in companies where control is more contestable. 
Regarding the number of elements of the coalitions, our research suggests that for the 
same level of contestability the effect on the value of firms is smaller in coalitions with 
three blockholders when compared to just two blockholders. Taken together, the results 
suggest a complementarity between “exit” and “voice” governance mechanisms and 
also the existence of an optimal number of blockholders.
Contrary to Jara-Bertin et al. (2008), we suggest that the contestability effect is stronger 
when the main blockholder owns less than 50% of control rights. In line with this result, 
the contestability effect is equally strong when coalitions do not have a dominant position.
We document that contestability has a weaker positive effect on the company value for 
family firms when compared to firms with other types of dominant shareholder. This 
result, which does not confirm previous evidence (Maury, Pajuste 2005; Jara-Bertin et al. 
2008), re-launches the question of what mechanisms support the publicized superiority of 
family firms. Our research also concludes that the coalitions constituted of members that 
belong to the same group of investors have a substantially reduced effect on the firm’s 
value. However when we analyze the particular case of family firms we do not find evi-
dence that suggests that the identity of who challenges the main blockholder is important.
Finally, our results indicate that, ceteris paribus, contestability in countries with good 
protection of minority shareholders has a smaller effect on the value of firms when com-
pared to countries with poor legal protection of investors. Thus, although our evidence 
is contrary to the results of Konijn et al. (2011) for the US it provides support for the 
idea that the institutional context moderates the contestability effect.
Despite efforts to make sure our analyses are as rigorous as possible, our study is subject 
to several limitations, which should be addressed in future research. First, we did not 
have access to information about the difference between control and cash flow rights; 
second, it might be argued that the number of years for the panel may be short.
The study analyses the effect of complex structures on firm value of large publicly held 
company in Western Europe. It would be interesting to analyze how our findings for large 
publicly held companies might change if smaller and private firms were to be examined.
Journal of Business Economics and Management, 2015, 16(3): 542–557
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